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ToRTs-UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEASORS ACT-GENERAL
RELEASE OF ONE ToRTFEASOR RELEASES ALL-Plaintiff, riding as a passenger
with X, was injured in an accident involving the automobile driven by X
and a truck owned by defendan~. Several months later X paid plaintiff
$1,518.87 and received a release.1 Plaintiff then brought an action in
trespass against the defendant, charging negligence in causing the accident
and claiming $10,000 damages. The defendant joined X as an additional
defendant and X pleaded the release. Defendant's amended answer claimed

l The release provided that plaintiff did "'•.• release and forever discharge [X] and
any and all other persons, associations and corporations, whether herein named or
referred to or not, of and from any and every claim, demand, right, or cause of
action .•• .'" Principal case at 550, 172 A.2d at 764. This release was a printed form of
the type commonly used in settling claims.
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that the broad language of the release, "any and all other persons,"2 within
the meaning of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,3
provided a release for the defendant also. The lower court entered
judgment on the pleadings against plaintiff, and in favor of both X and
the defendant. On appeal, held, affirmed, two justices dissenting. The intent
of plaintiff to release all of the tortfeasors was clearly evidenced, as required
by statute,4 by the language of the release. Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa.
549, 172 A.2d 764 (1961).
At common law a release given to one of a number of joint wrongdoers
was said to extinguish the cause of action, thus releasing all. 5 Recognizing
the harshness of such a rule when applied to cases where the consideration
received for the release was not intended to be a full satisfaction of the
injured party's claim, many jurisdictions have adopted modifications.
One succesful device is the covenant not to sue.6 Other courts have held
that an express reservation of a right to pursue other wrongdoers will
preserve the cause of action. 7 Prior to adoption of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act, however, Pennsylvania had rejected any modifications to the old common-law rule,8 and was one of a very small number of
jurisdictions in which a release of a single joint tortfeasor was impossible.9
Section 4 of the Uniform Act was intended to change the common-law rule
concerning releases10 and the Pennsylvania courts have recognized that the
legislature adopted it for that purpose. 11 However, an examination of the
decision in the principal case indicates that the court is not yet willing to
embrace whole-heartedly the policy considerations underlying the statute.
The common-law rule that a release of one tortfeasor released all was
grounded on the basic judicial policy of allowing an injured party but
See note l supra.
The UNIFORM CoN11UllUTION AMONG ToRTFEASORS Acr was adopted by Pennsylvania
in 1951. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-2089 (1951). The relevant provision is § 2085
(§ 4 of the Uniform Act) which reads as follows: "A release by the injured person of
one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other
tortfeasors unless the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tort•
feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release or in any amount or
proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced if greater
than the consideration paid." (Emphasis added.)
<t Ibid.
5 Cocke v. Jenner, Hob. 66, 80 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1614). Virtually all American
courts have followed the English rule. See, e.g., Bee v. Cooper, 217 Cal. 96, 17 P.2d 740
(1932) • See generally Annot., 148 A.L.R. 1270 (1944) •
6 See, e.g., Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P .2d 783 (1945) •
1 See, e.g., Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954).
8 Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 Atl. 107 (1937) (rejected reservation of right) ;
Smith v. Roydhouse, Arey 8e Co., 244 Pa. 474, 90 Atl. 919 (1914) (rejected covenant not
to sue).
g P1tossER, TORTS § 46, at 244 8e n.24 (2d ed. 1955) .
10 See Commissioner's Note, 9 UNIFORM L. ANN. 242 (1957) •
11 Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 275, 149 A.2d 648, 651 (1959).
2
3
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one satisfaction of his claim.12 One purpose of the Uniform Act is to
preserve this principle and yet to alleviate the harshness of the common-law
rule. The Uniform Act states that a release given to one wrongdoer will
not be construed to discharge the remaining tortfeasors unless the instrument "so provides." This provision was obviously designed to give effect
to the intent of the parties to a release. It is plain that an attempt to honor
the intent of the releasing party is not inconsistent with the policy of
prohibiting double recovery, for the question of intent is directed specifically to whether the claimant intended the release to represent satisfaction
in full for his injury.13 Furthermore, any possibility of a double recovery is
precluded by the provision of section 4 of the Uniform Act which stipulates
that the claim against other tortfeasors shall be reduced by the amount of
the consideration paid for the release.14 Any fears which a court might
entertain with respect to a possible injustice resulting from giving full effect
to the releasing party's intent would appear to be unwarranted. Yet, the
holding of the court in the principal case is based on an exceptionally
narrow finding,15 that the intent of the parties should be determined solely
by reference to the very general language of the release. It has been
suggested, indeed in this very jurisdiction, that a mere resort by the courts
to the language of an instrument, in ascertaining the intent of the parties,
is insufficient and improper. 16 Frequently the framework of the release
instrument is a printed form, as was the case here. Often, too, the parties
to a release will not contemplate its effect upon any persons but themselves.
Thus, a complete disregard of the facts and circumstances existing at the
time of the execution of the release may well result in a binding contract
which the parties never actually intended. Such a result would be in total
discord with the policy underlying the Uniform Act, as well as the
announced policy of the Pennsylvania courts.17
Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 Atl. 107 (1937) .
McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn.
119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954). See I HARPER 8: JAMES, TORTS § IO.I, at 713 (1956); PROSSER,
TORTS § 46, at 245 (2d ed. 1955). Cf. Raughley v. Delaware Coach Co., 47 Del. 343, 91 A.2d
245 (1952) (Uniform Act) •
14 See note 3 supra.
15 "The intent of the parties must be gleaned from the language of the release; such
language clearly and unequivocally shows the intent of the parties that [plaintiff] was
releasing his claims not only against [X] but against 'any and all' persons, including the
[defendant] .•••" Principal case at 552, 172 A.2d at 765.
16 Hegmann v. Mitchell, 179 Pa. Super. 123, 128, 116 A.2d 320, 322 (1955). See
Mayle v. Criss, 169 F. Supp. 58, 60 (W.D. Pa. 1958) (West Virginia statute): Comment,
107 U. PA. L. REV. 1213 (1959).
17 Brill's Estate, 337 Pa. 525, 12 A.2d 50, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 713 (1940) (words of
release should not be construed to make a contract which the parties never intended) :
Cockcroft v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 125 Pa. Super 293, 189 Atl. 687 (1937) (general
release does not bar a claim, the existence of which was not known to the party giving
the release); Pierce v. Sweet, 33 Pa. 151 (1859) (release not excepted from the rule that a
written instrument is construed according to the intention of the parties) .
12
13
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The harsh holding in the principal case is objectionable on several
grounds. Such a judicial attitude will tend to discourage settlements, since
it confuses this area of the law by a strict interpretation of the Uniform
Act in the light of the policy underlying the common-law rule, rather than
by giving effect to the intent of the parties in accordance with the purpose
of the statute. A more important objection, all too clearly illustrated by
the principal decision, is that an unwary claimant may fail to realize full
compensation. A third ground is that arguably the non-settling tortfeasor
should not be allowed to reap the benefits of a contract to which he was not
a party and for which he gave no consideration. This last objection was
the primary basis for the vigorous dissent in the principal case. But it
would seem that the real question raised is not who was intended to benefit
from the release but, rather, whether the release was intended to serve as a
full satisfaction of the injured party's claim. And only by reference to the
circumstances and the actions of the parties can the true intent be known.
This question properly should be presented for determination by the trier
of fact. 18 Introduction of such evidence generally would not violate the
parol evidence rule if the question of intent is directed to satisfaction of the
claim rather than to identification of the parties released.19 In the
principal case, extrinsic evidence directed toward a showing of intended
satisfaction, or lack of it, would not have tended to vary the terms of the
written agreement. A holding as a matter of law that the parties intended
the release to represent satisfaction of all claims is not justified where the
language of the release is so general as to fail to indicate any actually
formulated intent on this precise question.20
Robert L. Harmon
McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 664- (D.C. Cir. 1943).
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 217 (1954). Some courts have held that one not a party
to a release should not be allowed to raise an objection to parol evidence. E.g., Reams v.
Janoski, 268 Ill. App. 8 (1932) ; Fitzgerald v. Union Stock Yards Co., 89 Neb. 393, 131
N.W. 612 (19II).
20 Indeed, the Pennsylvania court in an earlier case stated: "Hence we believe that in
§ 4 the legislature quite reasonably enacted that such a release is not a discharge of other
tortfeasors unless it specifically so states." (Emphasis added.) Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa.
270, 275, 149 A.2d 648, 651 (1959) .
18
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